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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
H. C. TEBBS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. Case No. 7707 
LYXX PETERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal from a judgment 
dismissing his cause of action. The judgment of dis-
missal was ordered entered at the conclusion of plain-
tiff's evidence, which was taken before the court, sit-
ting without a jury. In making its Order of Dismissal, 
the Court said: "The court in this matter, after review-
ing the authorities submitted by both sides, has con-
cluded that the plaintiff is bound by the testimony 
given in the former hearing. The Court has also con-
cluded that considering the plaintiff's testimony and 
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the other evidence in this case that he has failed to 
establish that he didn't come within the provisions 
or the rule set forth in Dalley vs. Midwestern Products 
Company, for this reason, that in the present case the 
evidence for the plaintiff shows that the collision 
occurred on a straight stretch of highway. The plain-
tiff couldn't have been suddenly blinded by the lights 
of an oncoming automobile because had an automobile 
been proceeding in the opposite direction he would 
have seen those lights immediately after he rounded 
the curve. If he was blinded at that time he should 
have slowed down. He had a distance of between two 
and three hundred feet, as I recall from the testimony, 
in which he could have slowed down before this 
collision occurred. The motion for a dismissal will 
be granted." (Tr. 106) 
Thereafter counsel for the parties stipulated that 
Findings of Fact be waived and the Court make a 
formal Judgment of Dismissal. (R. 131). It is from 
the Judgment of Dismissal that plaintiff _prosecutes 
this appeal. 
In light of the grounds upon which the case was 
dismissed it is necessary to review the evidence offered 
and received at the trial: 
Keishi Hirose testified: That he resides at Los 
Angeles. That he was in an automobile with Mr. 
Tebbs on January 5, 1947. That they were on their 
way from Hannah to Duchesne. That when they 
turned beyond the Strawberry River two cars came 
with bright lights that blinded him. (Tr. 4) That 
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right on the corner there was a great big rock. That 
\Yhen they came to that rock and turned there was 
a big light that made us blind. That when they made 
the turn there was a truck \Yithout lights in the middle 
of the road. That he thought it was about 40 feet 
from the truck when he first saw the light. That he 
tried to stop :\lr. Tebbs who he thought stepped on 
the brakes. That he did not know what happened 
after the collision because he hit his head and was 
unconscious for eight or ten days. (Tr. 5) 
On cross-examination, he testified: That he went 
\Yith .Jir. Tebbs to see some cattle, which if they were 
nice cattle he was going to feed them. (Tr. 8) That 
he did not think the truck was 200 feet away when he 
first saw it. That he didn't remember making that 
statement. That he recalled bringing a suit against 
.Jir. Peterson. That he recalled being in the office 
of Rex Hansen. ( Tr. 9) That he recalled being asked 
the question ''How far was this truck ahead of your 
car when you first saw it~" and he answered "I guess 
will be two hundred feet." (Tr. 11) That when he 
first saw the truck, he yelled to Mr. Tebbs. That Mr. 
Tebbs had good lights; that the truck had no lights 
behind; that he was not quite sure that he saw the 
truck two hundred feet away. (Tr. 13) 
Harry C. Tebbs, the plaintiff, testified that: He 
is the plaintiff; that he resides in Salt Lake City; that 
he is in the insurance business and owns a farm at 
Ioka. That he was in Duchesne County, Utah on 
January 5, 1947. (Tr. 14) That on that day he had 
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been up to Hannah to look at some cattle he had up 
there; that Hirose, the J ap, accompanied him; that 
the J ap wanted to see the cattle and if they suited 
him he and his associates were going to feed the 
cattle; that in coming from Hannah you first go South 
and then go onto the main highway. That the night 
of the 5th of January, 1947 at about 7:00. o'clock he 
was driving a 1941 Chrysler; that it was dark and 
cloudy. (Tr. 15) That he was traveling about 35 to 
40 miles per hour. That as you approach and go 
beyond the Strawberry River, your view is obstructed 
by a large rock that comes out onto the road as you 
turn and there is a mountain that goes back from the 
rock a long way so you can't see around ~he rock. That 
just after he went around the turn he ran into Mr. 
Peterson's truck; that the truck was probably 300 
feet or maybe a little more beyond the turn on the 
main road going into Duchesne. That just before he 
ran into the Peterson truck he was blinded by a very 
strong light. (Tr. 16) That he could not say definitely 
how far he was from the truck when he first saw it, 
but probably fifty-seventy feet. "I can't say." That 
immediately when he saw the truck, he threw his foot 
on the brake and swung to the left to avoid hitting it. 
That he hit the left corner of the truck and part of 
his car went under the truck; that he was looking, 
straight ahead when he ran into the truck; that he had 
his car inspected at least once a month and frequently 
twice a month by the Freed Motor Company. (Tr. 
17) That he was driving on the right hand side of 
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the road and the truck was on the right hand side of 
the road when the collision occurred. That there were 
no tail lights or reflectors on the rear of the truck. 
That Hirose was rendered unconscious in the collision 
and '"as seriously injured. That the plaintiff, who 
was driving the automobile, was pinned under the 
steering wheel and his ribs were broken. (Tr. 18) 
That :Jir. Peterson and the two Ivy boys helped 
plaintiff out of the car. (Tr. 18) That just after the 
collision occurred, plaintiff asked defendant what he 
was doing with his car parked · on the highway, and 
the defendant replied, ''I am looking for a parking.'' 
That plaintiff asked to be taken out of the car. (Tr. 
19) That plaintiff was taken out of the car to Duchesne 
and then to the Roosevelt Hospital where X-rays were 
taken for ·which he paid $25.00 (Tr. 20). That the 
next day he was taken to Salt Lake to the L.D.S. Hos-
pital where he remained for five weeks, nearly six 
weeks; that at the hospital his lungs were treated by 
Dr. Viko. That X-rays were taken of his leg and a 
twenty pound weight was placed on his leg to pull his 
hip down; that his hip was dislocated and broken. 
That a Dr. Okelberry operated upon him. He was 
operated on twice. (Tr. 21) That he entered the hos-
pital at Salt Lake on the morning of the 6th and was 
operated upon 5 or 6 days later; that the first opera-
tion was through the knee and the second operation 
through the hip into the socket. (Tr. 22) That Dr. 
Viko treated the lungs and ribs of plaintiff. That 
plaintiff's wife nursed him most of the time; she was 
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there most of the time; that he was in the hospital 
until about the 12th or 15th of February. That he 
was on crutches after he was released from the hospital 
for about six months, until about October 1947; that he 
used a cane to walk with for nearly two years. (Tr. 
23) That he continuously suffered pain and his nerves 
were so upset he couldn't digest his food; his stomach 
was paining him and he suffered with gas. That at 
the time of his injury he was in charge of the office 
of the Occidental Life Insurance Company where he 
made between six and seven hundred dollars per month 
from his labor. That he had at least thirty agents work-
ing under him. (Tr. 24) That the costs of plaintiff's 
medical and hospital treatment was: Roosevelt Hospital 
$25.00, Dr. Boren $25.00, L.D.S. Hospital $59.65 and 
later $279.85, Dr. Okelberry $250.00, Dr. Viko $50.00, 
Mr. Dillman for ambulance in taking plaintiff from 
Roosevelt to Salt Lake $35.00, for a nurse $50.00, 
making a total of $840.50 (Tr. 25) which amount was 
later corrected to be $824.50. That the automobile he 
was driving was of a value of $1800.00 immediately 
before the accident and it was sold as a wreck after 
the accident for $400.00 (Tr. 26) That the automobile 
belonged to the plaintiff, but it was registered in his 
wife's name, but she did not claim to own it though 
she frequently used it. (Tr. 27) That since the ac-
cident the earning power of the plaintiff is about 
$200.00 per month; that his health will not permit the 
witness to work continuously; that at the time of the 
accident the plaintiff was 63 years of age. (Tr. 28) 
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On cross-exa1nination, the plaintiff testified that 
since the accident he gets down to his office a couple 
of hours some days, and son1e days does not go to the 
office at all. (Tr. 29) That witness gets part of the 
profits that come to the office. (Tr. 31) That the 
automobile driven by the plaintiff was in good shape 
at the time of the accident. It had good brakes and 
good li~hts and on low beam you could see approxi-
mately 200 feet in head of you. (Tr. 32) That is an 
estimate but he had not checked it; that he did not 
know how far the truck was in front of him when he 
first saw it, but he would estimate the distance as 50 
feet; that it couldn't have been 12 feet that he might 
have said it was 12 feet, but if he did that was wrong; 
that he may have said twenty feet. (Tr. 33) 
Counsel for defendant read from what he claimed 
was testimony offered at the first trial the following: 
"Q: About how far was it from you when 
you first observed it~" 
"A: Well that would be hard to say. I don't 
think it could have been over twenty feet." 
"A: Yes sir. Because I immediately slapped 
my right foot down and whirled my car with 
all the power I could to the left.'' 
That at one time he said it was not over twelve 
feet, but later he amended his answer and stated that 
he thought it was fifty feet; that the place of the 
accident was one hundred or two hundred feet fron1 
the curve. (Tr. 34) That he was confused by the dia-
gram that was used. (Tr. 35) That he placed the HCT 
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on the diagram but later found he was 1n error and 
changed the same. ( Tr. 36) 
Plaintiff further testified on cross-examination that 
his memory is clearer now than it was when he first 
testified; that he was very nervous and upset when ~ 
first testified and hadn't put the study and thought on 
it (what occurred at the time of the accident), that he 
has now. ''My best recollection now is that I was 
blinded.'' That he was conscious following the ac-
cident; that at the other trial "I mentioned that they 
(lights) must have blinded me, that is my recollection 
and there was something prevented me from seeing 
that car, it must have been blinding me.'' 
That he testified as follows at the former trial: 
'' Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr. Tebbs 
that the truck that you saw on the highway, 
or the object, was about twelve feet in front of 
you when you first saw it~ 
A. That's right, when I saw it. 
Q. Then you were watching ahead of you, 
weren't you~ 
A. Well, the only thing that has got me 
there, if I may answer, there could have been 
a car coming that might have blinded me some-
what. 
Q. Well, was there a car coming~ Did 
you see any car coming~ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, in other words the fact there 
could have been a car coming is just a pos-
sibility, you don't remember anything like that, 
do you, at this time~ 
A. I don't.'' 
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Did you so testify' 
• · ~\.. I did. The '"itness further testified. 
But may I state I was thinking of lights, not 
car, if you are blinded you can't see a car, I 
couldn't. (Tr. 40) 
Q. ~\s a n1atter of fact, didn't you tell us 
before that when you testified the reason you 
didn't see the truck was as you came east around 
the curve your lights shot off the highway, and 
when you suddenly straightened out to go south-
east on the straight-of-way the truck was right 
in front of you; didn't you so testify that~ 
A. I think so, yes sir, that's right. 
Q. The last time we were over here on 
this case we were here about three and a half 
days, were we not~ 
A. I was, yes sir. 
Q. And other than what you said there 
was a possibility there was a car could ha:ve 
blinded you, there wasn't anything said about 
lights any time during that trial, was there~ 
A. This was the only instance I remember 
of. 
Q. And in your testimony at that time that 
was a mere possibility; isn't that right~ 
A. That was right as to lights, but as to 
car I don't contend I ever saw a car, I was 
blinded. That is the confusion of that testi-
mony." (Tr. 41) 
Plaintiff further testified that he was blinded a 
second after he came around the turn and got 
straightened up which was approximately 100 feet 
around the turn; that he was traveling 35 or 40 miles 
per hour; that the glare of the lights were such that 
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he couldn't say whether there was one or two lights; 
that ever since the accident he has had in mind some-
thing that prevented him from seeing the car; that 
he was looking down the highway and driving care-
fully; that he did not have time to turn to his left and 
go around the truck because he was doing his best. 
(Tr. 43) That the truck was in the right driving lane 
and the other lane was clear; that at the time of the 
collision his car had been turned about three feet to 
the left to avoid hitting the truck; that according to 
his judgment the truck was stopped at the time of the 
collision. (Tr. 44) That after the collision, plaintiff's 
car and the truck were six or eight feet apart. (Tr. 
46) 
Rulon Ashby, a witness called by the plaintiff, testi-
fied that he is in the insurance business; that on Jan-
uary 5, 1947 he was on his way, in an automobile 
driven by Mr. Bodily, from Salt Lake City to Vernal; 
that on the evening of that day as it was getting dark 
he saw Mr. Lynn Peterson about half way to the top 
of Daniels Canyon. (Tr. 58) That the lights had been 
turned on the Bodily car; that the Peterson truck was 
loaded with feed and stopped in the right hand lane 
of traffic; that there were no lights on the rear of the 
truck. (Tr. 59) That Mr. Peterson was having trouble 
with the fan that runs the generator and asked Mr. 
Ashby to call his, (Peterson's) Mother and to send 
some one to come out and help him. (Tr. 60) 
The testimony of Elise Ashby is to the same effect 
as that of her husband. Mrs. Ashby further testified 
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that the front lights on ~lr. Peterson's truck were on 
when he was stopped on the road in Daniels Canyon ; 
that there were no rear lights on the truck. (Tr. 64-
5) 
:Jlr. Owen Bodily, called as a witness by the 
plaintiff, testified that he resides in Vernal; that on 
January 5, 1947 he, in company with Mr. and Mrs. 
Ashby and ~Irs. Bodily, was driving his automobile 
from Salt Lake to Vernal ; that prior to seeing a truck 
up in Daniels Canyon, he turned on his lights ; that 
he saw Mr. Peterson and his truck about half way 
up the hill from Heber; that there were no rear lights 
on the truck; that at the time he saw Mr. Peterson 
and his truck, it was getting dark. (Tr. 66-7) 
The testimony of Mrs. Myril Bodily, the wife of 
Owen Bodily, is to the same effect. (Tr. 69) 
Robert Marchant, a witness called by the plain-
tiff, testified that he resides at Ioka; that he is ac-
quainted with Mr. Tebbs, (Tr. 69) and with Lynn 
Peterson (Tr. 70) ; that he was at the scene of a col-
lision between an automobile driven by Mr. Tebbs and 
a truck driven by Mr. Peterson about four years ago. 
That he and Mr. Wilkerson were on their way to Salt 
Lake in an old Packard with a semi-trailer body built 
onto the back of it. (Tr. 70) That shortly after they 
crossed the bridge west of Duchesne an automobile 
passed them; that was about a mile or a mile and a 
half East of the place of the accident; that the auto-
mobile that passed them was going in the same direc-
tion as they were, which was towards Salt Lake. (Tr. 
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71) That when they pulled onto the top of the hill 
they could see the headlights of two or three cars 
down the hill; that as they approached the scene of 
the accident, they met a car just leaving and the truck 
was moving when they first passed it. ('Tr. 72) That 
the Tebbs car was not moving when he first saw it; 
that when he first went over to the cars they were prob-
ably eight feet apart, maybe a trifle more; that the 
truck was right near the center of the road when he 
first saw it; that after it was moved two of the left 
two wheels were off the hard surfaced portion of the 
highway. (Tr. 73) That he saw Mr. Peterson who 
asked for and got a pair of pliers from Mr. Wilker-
son with whom Mr. Marchant was riding; that when 
he arrived the J ap was still in Mr. Tebbs car in a 
semi- conscious condition; that he remained at the 
scene of the the accident from one-half to an hour, 
perhaps more than that. That there were no tail-
lights on the truck; there was a light on the right-hand 
side some eight or ten inches from the corner upon the 
south side as the truck faced east; (Tr. 74) that there 
were no other lights or reflectors on the back end of 
the truck; that when he first saw the Tebbs car it was 
across the highway; that the collision occurred near 
the hotel sign. (Tr. 75-6) That the car that took Mr. 
Tebbs away pulled out just as they got to the scene 
of the accident. (Tr. 77) 
David Marlin Wilkerson, a witness called by the 
plaintiff, testified that he resides at Roosevelt, Utah 
and is a welder and mechanic, (Tr. 83) and has been 
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such since 1942; that from his experience he can tell 
whether a break in a piece of metal is a new or old 
break; that he "·as in company with Mr. Marchant in 
a Packard with a trailer on his way to Salt Lake when 
they came to the place where a collision had occurred 
between the automobile of Mr. Tebbs and the truck of 
Lynn Peterson; that the collision occurred about four 
or five miles west of Duchesne. That :a number of 
cars passed them between the scene of the accident 
and Duchesene; that one car passed probably about 
a mile east of the point of collision; that the witness 
was traveling about 20 to 25 miles per hour; that the 
car that he recalls passing him was traveling about 
30 or 35 miles per hr. (Tr. 85) That when he arrived 
at the top of the hill east of where the accident occur-
red, he noticed the lights and then a spotlight was 
wavering across the road in front of them; that he 
probably remained at the scene of the accident about 
an hour; that the witness helped Mr. Peterson put out 
flares; that there were no lights on the rear of the 
truck and the witness did not notice any reflectors; 
that he looked under the truck to see if there were 
any tail lights (Tr. 86) ; that there had been a tail 
light on the side of the truck on the frame, but the 
wires weren't connected; that the wires had been 
broken for quite sometime; that one set of the wires 
was rusty and the other was full of dirt and corroded ; 
that there was a clearance light along the left-hand 
side that had been broken and one on the right hand 
side that was all right, but the wires had been broken 
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off; (Tr. 87) that the clearance light was along the 
side of the truck probably eight inches back of the 
corner along the side of the frame toward the front. 
(Tr. 88) That when he arrived at the scene of the 
accident, the truck was on the oil and the car was kind 
of kitty-corner over the yellow line. They were about 
eight feet apart; that the left-hand dual of the truck 
was right near the yellow line; the truck had ten tires; 
some of the tires were flat; that the truck was loaded 
with sacks which were brown and appeared to contain 
feed of two hundred pounds each. ( Tr. 90) 
On cross-examination, he testified that the chan-
nel frame on the hack of the truck had been bent up; 
that the auto had evidently hit the truck on the left 
side. (Tr. 94) 
Mrs. Dot F. Tebbs, the wife of the plaintiff testi-
fied about the nature of the plaintiff's injuries and 
that she did not own the automobile that her husband 
was driving at the time of the collision, but as such 
matters do not bear directly on the question presented 
for review, we shall not abstract her testimony. (Tr. 
100 et seq.) 
After the plaintiff had offered the evidence which 
we have heretofore summarized in some detail, the trial 
court took the case from the jury and orally made 
the order which we have heretofore quoted in this 
Brief. Later on May 12, 1951 the Judge signed the 
written Order of Dismissal which was filed in the 
court below on May 15, 1951 (R. 131) It is from the 
Judgment of Dismissal that plaintiff prosecutes this 
appeal. 
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~-\.SSIG XhlE~TS O:B-, ERROR 
The plaintiff assigns as error the trial court's 
Judgment of Dismissal. The error committed by the 
trial court in disn1issing the action may be discussed 
under two points, they being: 
POINT ONE 
The trial court was in error when 1n its oral de-
cision it in effect held that the plaintiff was bound by 
the testimony given by him at the former trial and 
being so bound he could not be heard to now claim 
that he was blinded by the lights of a motor vehicle 
coming from the opposite direction which prevented 
him from seeing the truck in time to avoid the collision 
which resulted in his injury. (R. 131) 
POINT TWO 
The trial court was in error 1n dismissing the 
cause on the ground that as a matter of law the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence which proxi-
mately contributed to the plaintiff's injury and the 
damage to his automobile. (R. 131) 
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PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY 
WHICH HE GAVE AT THE FIRST TRIAL AND EVEN IF 
HE IS SO BOUND, SUCH TESTIMONY DOES NOT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW PRECLUDE HIM FROM RECOVERY 
IN THIS ACTION. 
It will be noted that Mr. Tebbs, the plaintiff, at 
a former trial testified that he did not see the truck 
until he was within about twelve feet from the truck 
(this testimony was later changed to fifty feet). Mr. 
Tebbs was asked these questions and gave these 
answers: 
"Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr. Tebbs, 
that the truck that you saw on the highway, or 
the object, was about twelve feet in front of 
you when you first saw it~ 
A. That's right, when I saw it. 
Q. Then you were watching ahead of you, 
weren't you~ 
A. Well, the only thing that has got me 
there, if I may answer, there could have been 
a car coming that might have blinded me some-
what. 
Q. Well, was there a car coming~ Did you 
see any car coming~ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, in other words, the fact there 
could have been a car coming is just a pos-
sibility. You don't remember anything like that 
do you at this time~ 
A. I don't.'' 
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Plaintiff gave this version of his reason for so 
testifying on the former occasion. 
· 'Q. Did you so testify~ 
~-\.. I did, but may I state I was thinking of 
lights, not cars. If you are blinded, you can't 
see a ca~ I couldn'~ 
Q. As a matter of fact didn't you tell us 
before that when you testified the reason you 
didn't see the truck was as you came east around 
the curve your lights shot off the highway, and 
when you suddenly straightened out to go south-
east on the straight-of-way the truck was right 
in front of you; didn't you so testify that~ 
A. I think so, yes sir, that's right." 
Further on in his testimony, he answers that he 
was confused, in that he was being questioned about a 
car and he had in mind lights; that he did not contend 
that he saw a car; that he was blinded so that he could 
not see the car; that it might have been a motorcycle 
but he believed it was a car. (Tr. 41) 
The testimony of the plaintiff as to there being 
bright lights on a motor vehicle approaching from the 
east just before the collision is corroborated by Mr. 
I-Iirose, the J ap, who was riding in the front seat with 
the plaintiff. Mr. Hirose testified that he was blinded 
and did not see the truck until within fifty feet of it. 
Certainly if the J ap was blinded as he testified he was, 
it is a reasonable conclusion that the jury might reach 
that the plaintiff was blinded. The testimony of Messrs. 
Marchant and 'Vilkerson tends to corroborate the 
testimony of plaintiff and the J ap in that an automobile 
passed them at a time when it might well have been 
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in such a position on the road that it could have pre-
vented the plaintiff in the exercise of due care from 
seeing the truck until it was too late to avoid hitting it. 
Moreover, the authorities and adjudicated cases 
do not support the doctrine announced by the trial 
court in his oral decision that the plaintiff is bound 
by the testimony he gave at the first trial. The authori-
ties are to the contrary. It is a matter of every day 
occurence that a witness on further reflection concludes 
that he has been in error in his testimony and later 
seeks to correct the error. Indeed if a witness con-
cludes he has erred in giving testimony, it frequently 
becomes his duty to correct the same. Any other rule 
would frequently perpetuate an injustice. 
The following are among the text writers and 
adjudicated cases which are at variance with the hold-
ing of the trial court as to the effect of prior testimony 
given by a witness: 
The law touching the effect of former testimony 
given by a party to an action is thus stated in 31 C.J.S., 
Section 402, page 1211 ; 
"Testimony by a party on a former trial of 
the case or of another case will not estop him 
from giving testimony contradictory thereto if he 
can show his former testimony was given in-
considerately, by mistake, or without full knowl-
edge of the facts. His former testimony is not 
conclusive against him even though it is unex-
plained.'' 
A number of cases are cited in a foot note to the 
text and we have added a number of other cases to 
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the san1e effect. Among the cases so holding are: Jones 
v. J.llajor, 55 S.E. (2nd) 846; 80 Ga. app. ~23; Smith v. 
Produ.cers Cold Storage Co. (Mo) 128 S. W. (2d) 
299; Pogu.e v. Oreat X orthern R. Co., 148 N. W. 889; 
1~7 ~linn 79; Schroeder v. Wells, 298 S. W. 806; Little 
v. Straw (Pa) 192 Atl894; Rowe v. Goldberg Film De-
lirery Lines 50 Ariz. 285, 72 Pac (2d) 432; Goodwin 
et al v. Robinson et al., 22 Cal App (2) 283; 66 Pac 
(~d) 1:257; J{yne v. J(yne, 38 Cal App (2) 122; 100 Pac 
(2d) 806; Hall v. Bakersfield Community Hotel Corpora-
tion, 5~ Cal App (2) 158; 125 Pac (2d) 889; Rage v. 
Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268; 20 N.E. (2d) 751; McClary v. 
11litchern, 29 S. E. (2d) 329. The case of Morton v. Hood 
tends to support the general rule, 105 Utah 484; 143 
Pac (2d) 434. 
The foregoing cases go much farther in support 
of the view that prior statements made by a party 
or other witness at a former trial are not binding at 
a subsequent trial than is necessary to go here. In-
deed, the testimony of the plaintiff at the prior trial 
is not necessarily at variance with the testimony he 
gave at the trial which is here on appeal. It will be 
noted at the former hearing, counsel for the defendant 
on his cross-examination studiously refrained from in-
quiry about any lights and confined his questions as to 
whether or not the witness saw a car. If the witness 
had said he saw a car as he rounded the curve just be-
fore the collision occurred, counsel would doubtless have 
argued that the witness could not see the car if he 
was blinded. The plaintiff apparently did not want to 
fall for such entrapment. 
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POINT TWO 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT SHOW THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE THAT PROXIMATELY 
CONTRIBUTED TO HIS INJURIES AND THE DAMAGE 
TO HIS AUTOMOBILE. 
In its Oral Decision the court took the view that 
this case falls within the doctrine announced in the 
case of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co. 80 
Utah 331, 15 Pac (2d) 309. The facts in the Dalley 
case and the cases upon which it is based are so un-
like the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case 
that the Dalley case may not be said to be a precedent 
for the ruling here complained of. 
In the Dalley case, a truck was parked on the 
oiled portion of the highway without any lights in the 
rear. The road over which Mr. Dalley was driving was 
a level oiled highway and was straight for a mile or 
more before Dalley reached the place where the truck 
.was parked; there was nothing to obstruct ~ir. Dalley's 
view; Dalley met no one and no one passed him in the 
vicinity of where the truck was standing; there was 
no wind, the moon was not shining, it was not cloudy, 
it was an ordinary summer night; Dalley was travel-
ling about 25 miles per hour. He could have brought 
his car to a dead stop in 50 feet at that speed, if he 
had seen the truck forty feet away he thought he 
could have stopped or turned and thus avoided the 
collision that resulted in his injury. 
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It is quite apparent that the controlling facts in 
this ease are so unlike the facts in the Dalley case 
that the former case is of little value in reaching a 
proper conclusion in the present case. The cases are 
alike in that a truck, contrary to law, was parked on 
the oiled portion of the highway without any lights 
on the rear of the truck. In such particular the cases 
are alike and conclusively show that the defendant in 
each case was guilty of negligence at the time of the 
collision. 
In this case the evidence shows that a large rock 
obstructed the view of the plaintiff at a point where 
the road turned from an easterly to a southeasterly 
direction and a ridge or mountain extended from the 
large rock so that one approaching from the west could 
not see around the rock. Unlike the facts in the Dalley 
case, the evidence in this case shows that at a point 
about 100 feet beyond the curve (as plaintiff rounded 
the curve) a bright light blinded plaintiff and his 
companion so that he, for an instant, was unable to 
see the truck which was loaded with brown sacks and 
without any lights on the rear of the truck. 
The testimony in this case shows that the defen-
dant's truck was parked at a distance estimated from 
200 to 300 feet Southeasterly from the curve in the 
road where the big rock obstructs the view of one ap-
proaching from the West towards the East (Tr. 34 
and Tr. 16). The evidence also shows that as plaintiff 
had rounded the curve and had straightened his auto-
mobile so that the lights threw down the highway and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
at a point about 100 feet from the curve, he was blinded 
by the lights of the oncoming car (Tr. 43). He saw the 
truck when a distance of between 50 and 70 feet from 
it (Tr. 17), and during the time it took him to cover 
that distance he was making every effort to avoid 
the truck. He, therefore, was blinded a distance of 
from 50 to 150 feet during which he did not see the 
defendant's truck on the highway. The reaction time 
of men of his age is at least a second and traveling at 
a speed of thirty-five or forty miles an hour he had to 
have from fifty to sixty feet before he could react. It 
is thus apparent that the short interval of time did 
not give him an opportunity to slow down or stop. 
If the truck had been equipped with red lights on 
the rear it is reasonable to assume and the jury would 
certainly have been justified in finding that plaintiff 
would have seen the red lights in time to avoid the 
collision. The very purpose of requiring red lights on 
the rear of motor vehicles is to warn the traveling 
public that there is danger ahead. 
It will be noted that the Dalley case was decided 
by a two to three decision. The decision has been sub-
ject to some adverse criticism but has not been re-
versed. However, this Court has refused to extend the 
doctrine of that case. In the cases of Nielsen v. Wa~tan­
abe, 90 Utah 401, '62 Pac (2d) 117; Trimble v. Union 
Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac (2d) 674 and 
Moss v. Christensen-Gardner Inc., 98 Utah 253, 98 Pac 
(2d) 363, this Court has held that the doctrine an-
nounced in the majority opinion in the Dalley case is 
subject to limitations and exceptions. 
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In the cases of Nielsen v. Jr atanabe and Moss v. 
Christensen-Gardner Inc., supra, this Court held that 
when one is blinded by the lights of an oncoming auto-
mobile and while so blinded and without sufficient time to 
slow down collides with an automobile or other ob-
struction unlawfully placed on a highway without warn-
ing signals or lights, he nmy not be said to be guilty 
of contributory negligence. In the Trimble case the 
Court followed the same rule but applied the excep-
tion to a driver of a vehicle whose vision was tempo-
rarily restricted by fog. 
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in 
3-4 Huddy Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Edition, 
Page 59, Section 30 and the cases there cited. 
The testimony in this case brings it clearly within 
the law announced in the foregoing cases. 
\Ye find· it difficult to follow the Court's logic in 
reaching the conclusion he did and still greater diffi-
culty in believing that it was within the province of 
the Court to lay down a rule of law to the effect that 
it was the duty of the plaintiff to slow down or stop 
when he saw an automobile approaching from the op-
posite direction. If the operator of a motor vehicle is 
required to slow down or stop when he sees an auto-. 
mobile approaching from the opposite direction, we 
wonder what will happen to traffic, especially where 
there may be two or more automobiles proceeding in 
the same direction in close proximity to each other and 
especially out in the country where traffic moves at 
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a greater speed. If the automobile In the lead should 
suddenly slow down or stop, the automobile immediately 
behind might well collide with the automobile in the 
lead thereby resulting in injury and liability to the 
operator of the automobile so suddenly slowing down 
or stopping. 
Moreover, the plaintiff did not testify that he was 
blinded immediately after he made the turn. Section 
57-7 198 (2), Utah Code Annotated, requires that the 
headlights on automobiles shall be of sufficient intensity 
to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at lea.:;t 
200 feet. Section 57-7 191 of the Code provides that 
a parked or stopped vehicle must be equipped with a 
red light in the rear visible at least a distance of 500 
feet. The evidence shows that the plaintiff had his 
lights inspected at least once a month and that the 
same were in good condition. That being so, his lights 
should reveal the parked truck at a distance of 200 
feet from the rear. If the plaintiff was traveling at 
3! rate of 35 or 40 miles per hour he was covering be-
tween 50 and 60 feet per second. He was blinded a 
distance of from 50 to 150 feet. He had only between 
one and three seconds to slow down or stop. If the law 
is so exacting as the trial Court indicates in his oral 
opinion, namely that a driver of an automobile even 
though temporarily blinded, has no cause to complain 
of injuries sustained by him because another, at night 
parks his truck ~without rear lights on a public high-
way, then no useful purpose is served the public by re-
quiring vehicles to be equipped with lights. 
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CONCLUSION 
\Ye submit that the Court should have submitted 
the case to the jury and that this Court should remand 
the ca~e to the Court below with directions to grant 




J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorneys for Plainttiff-Appellant 
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